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Foreword 
In September, 1988, the Hogg Foundation held the s ixth i n its series 
of Robert Sutherland Seminars, this one focusing on community 
care for the chronically mentally i l l . Approximately two hundred 
key individuals from across the state of Texas came to listen and 
respond to nationally and internationally recognized experts on this 
topic of growing importance. 
Prior to the conference, participants were sent a number of 
published papers thought to be most up to date and germane to the 
topic at hand. A second set of papers, especially commissioned for 
the seminar, was also circulated and w i l l ult imately be compiled 
into the proceedings volume for the seminar. While each of those 
commissioned papers held special significance and value for the 
topic of community response to the mentally i l l i n general or i n the 
state of Texas specifically, one particular paper seemed to relay the 
background of our current state of mental health law i n a way that 
both laypersons and professionals found extremely useful. Written 
whi le she was a staff attorney at the Mental Health L a w Project i n 
Washington, D . C . from 1984 to 1988, Arlene Ranter's overview 
provides a r ich and fascinating context for the understanding of the 
contemporary mental health law arena. 
Ms. Kanter is presently professor at Syracuse Universi ty School of 
L a w and Director of the Housing and Finance Program, a program 
designed to meet the housing needs of homeless persons. She earned 
the J .D. from N e w York Universi ty School of L a w and the L l . M . 
from Georgetown Universi ty L a w Center. Currently she is writ ing a 
book tentatively titled, ' 'New Neighbors: Expanding Housing Op-
portunities for People w i t h Mental Disabil it ies ' ' and continues to 
serve as a consultant to the Mental Health L a w Project. 
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Introduction 
Mental health law has come of age. In the past two decades the field 
of law concerned w i t h the rights of people w i t h mental disabilities 
has grown dramatically. T h e federal and state courts, the Congress, 
and state legislatures have discussed and i n some cases created new 
rights and obligations for people who are labeled mentally i l l . 
M u c h of the discussion has focused on the debate between 
psychiatrists and advocates about compulsory treatment. Psychia-
trists charge that protecting people from compulsory treatment 
leaves them to ''die''^ or ''rot"^ w i t h their rights on. T h e other side is 
often equally accusatory, referring to patients as ''prisoners of 
psychiatry.''^ 
But whi le this debate continues, the challenge of providing much-
needed services to people w i t h mental i l lness—voluntary or not— 
remains largely unmet. T h e number of homeless people i n need of 
housing, social support, and treatment v iv idly illustrates the need 
for advocacy. Some have called for return of the "asy lu m"—to 
rehospitalize people who are unable to make it on their own. Yet 
such proposals are simplistic at best. A s John Talbott has written, 
the choice between rehospitalization and homelessness " i s l ike 
choosing death by strangulation or death by drowning."^ 
Developing needed services i n the community has been difficult. 
Reliance on the courts and legislatures for adequate systems of 
mental health care has met w i t h mixed success. Such systems are 
expensive, and legislatures are generally reluctant to mandate new 
spending. Courts vary i n their approach. Some judges w i l l aggres-
sively protect individual rights and entitlements, ordering the 
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provision of services at any cost. Other courts are either baffled by 
the legal issues i n mental health care or unwi l l ing to order expendi-
ture of state funds. Further, even if courts recognize violation of a 
legal right, few involve themselves i n implementation—a process 
that is tedious at best and fraught w i t h political, administrative, and 
legal pitfalls. 
Yet despite these apparent obstacles, much has been accom-
plished i n recent years. O n the federal level, courts and Congress 
have struggled w i t h difficult questions around the rights of people 
w i t h mental disabilities. Such struggles have often resulted i n the 
establishment of new legal rights or the expenditure of substantial 
resources. O n the state level, courts and legislatures have con-
sidered such difficult issues as the proper standard for commitment 
and the practicality of outpatient commitment, referring to an 
individual's court-ordered treatment i n the community. 
T h i s paper w i l l explore the developing law w i t h respect to 
mentally i l l individuals ' rights to services and treatment, both i n 
and outside of hospital settings. 
The Right to Treatment in the Hospital and 
in the Community 
A n y discussion of developments i n mental health law must begin 
w i t h a look at the wave of lawsuits brought against mental 
institutions i n the 1970s. Landmark lawsuits, relying on novel 
constitutional theories, established the rights of people w i t h men-
tal illness as w e l l as developmental disability to treatment and 
protection from harm,^ to procedural and substantive protections i n 
the c i v i l commitment process,^ to safeguards against intrusive and 
hazardous procedures such as sterilization or forced medication,^ 
and to appropriate community services.^ Th e legacy of these cases is 
a growing body of law governing institutional treatment, w h i c h has 
spawned many class actions and individual lawsuits . 
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The first case addressing the right to treatment was Rouse v. 
Cameron,^ i n 1966. Rouse was committed to Saint Elizabeths 
Hospital i n 1962 after being found not guilty by reason of insanity 
for a misdemeanor punishable by a one-year m a x i m u m sentence. 
After three years of hospitalization, Rouse petitioned for release on 
the ground that he had received no psychiatric treatment. Th e court 
granted his petition, holding that the "[pjurpose of involuntary 
hospitalization is treatment, not punishment . . . .Absent treat-
ment, the hospital is transf o r m [ e d ] . . . into a penitentiary where one 
could be held indefinitely for no convicted offense. While the 
decision was hailed as a victory by those who viewed it as a step 
forward i n reforming the deplorable state hospital where people 
were confined, then forgotten, it was not unt i l Wyatt v. Stickney^^ 
that the right to treatment emerged as a fundamental legal doctrine. 
In Wyatt v, Stickney, a United States district court i n Alabama 
made history by ruling that mentally handicapped persons involun-
tarily confined to a state institution have a constitutional right to 
treatment. The case began as an effort to stop the state from firing 
hospital employees because of budget cuts. After studying the 
record and touring the hospital. Judge Frank M . Johnson, Jr. declared 
in 1971 that the dreadful conditions there violated c iv i l ly com-
mitted patients' constitutional right to treatment. He wrote that 
" involuntari ly committed patients unquestionably have a constitu-
tional right to receive such individual treatment as w i l l give each of 
them a realistic opportunity to be cured or improve his or her 
mental condition. T h e court went on to state that "to deprive any 
citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the 
confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to 
provide adequate treatment violates the fundamentals of due pro-
cess."'^ 
Accordingly, one year later, a detailed consent decree was 
adopted, requiring compliance w i t h specific standards on such 
matters as floor space, toilet doors, and other l iving arrangements. 
The decree also imposed patient-staff ratios, required detailed 
individual treatment plans w i t h i n 48 hours of admission, pro-
hibited excessive medication and the use of medication as a 
punishment or for staff convenience or as a substitute for programs, 
required that work done by patients must be voluntary and compen-
sated at m i n i m u m wages, restricted physical restraint and isola-
tion, and guaranteed to patients their right to privacy, mai l , phone, 
and visitors. 
Th e legal theory i n Wyatt and its progeny is straightforward: 
When the state deprives an individual of liberty i n order to provide 
treatment , i t has an obligation to provide that treatment . 
Nonetheless, Wyatt was criticized sharply as improperly encroach-
ing upon the psychiatrist's purview—cri t i c i sm that was repeated 
following the Supreme Court's historic decision i n establishing the 
right to liberty, i n O'Connor v. Donaldson.^"^ 
Kenneth Donaldson had been c iv i l ly committed and confined for 
14 years when he sued state hospital psychiatrists for damages, 
alleging that members of the hospital staff had intentionally and 
maliciously deprived h i m of his constitutional right to liberty. O n 
June 26, 1975, the United States Supreme Court unanimously held 
that patients " w ho are not dangerous to themselves or others, are 
receiving only custodial care and are capable of surviving safely i n 
freedom or w i t h the help of family or friends" could not be 
institutionalized against their will .^^ 
T h e next step after Wyatt and Donaldson i n the Supreme Court 
came i n 1982 w i t h the Court's decision i n Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 
U.S . 307 (1982). In Youngberg, the Court was, for the first time, 
presented w i t h the task of outlining the scope of the rights of people 
w i t h mental retardation under the fourteenth amendment to the 
United States Constitution. In Youngberg, an institutionalized 
person w i t h mental retardation, through his mother, sued the state 
claiming his constitutional rights had been violated by the state 
facil ity's failure to provide h i m w i t h adequate treatment and by the 
facil ity's use of inappropriate treatment, including mechanical 
restraints. T h e Court, i n an unanimous decision, held that the 
substantive rights provided by the United States Constitution 
define only the m i n i m u m . Although the resident had a constitu-
tional right to training i n basic self-care ski l ls to help minimize his 
aggressive outbursts consistant w i t h his liberty interest i n avoiding 
frequent restraints, as w e l l as certain l imited rights to adequate 
food, shelter, clothing, medical care, safety and freedom of move-
ment, none of these rights was "absolute." According to the Court, 
these rights are subject to implementation consistent w i t h "profes-
sional judgment." In short, the Court failed to recognize a per se 
right of people w i t h mental retardation to treatment or to be treated 
i n the least restrictive environment. Th e issue is s t i l l unresolved, 
however, for people w i t h mental illness. 
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In two other cases, courts have established a right to treatment i n 
the least restrictive setting for residents of state mental hospitals. In 
Brewster v. Dukakis^^ and Dixon v. Weinberger/^ patients confined 
to state hospitals brought class-action lawsuits to establish that 
they had a right to placement i n less restrictive settings outside the 
hospital—in particular, placements consistent w i t h their treat-
ment needs. Such a right presumes the state's continuing responsi-
bility to provide basic care, shelter, and other necessities whi le 
retaining the m i n i m u m amount of control over the individual. 
Conflict arises, however, when the state is ordered to develop 
services i n the community i n order to allow the individual to leave 
the institution. 
Brewster was filed i n 1976 on behalf of institutionalized and 
noninstitutionalized people i n the western part of Massachusetts. 
The case was brought to compel the state to implement a 1966 state 
law empowering the Department of Mental Health to create a 
comprehensive system of community programs instead of enhanc-
ing services i n the large state hospitals. Brewster was settled i n 
1978, and its effect has vastly improved community-based services 
in western Massachusetts.^^ 
Filed i n 1974, Dixon v. Weinberger sought to establish that under 
the United States Constitution and Distr ict of Columbia statutes, 
patients at the federally operated St. Elizabeths Hospital i n Wash-
ington, D . C . had a right to treatment i n less restrictive facilities, 
consistent w i t h individual needs. O n December 23, 1975, the 
federal district court held that the city and federal governments had 
a joint obligation under D . C . law to provide suitable care and 
treatment outside the hospital to a l l patients who did not require 
hospitalization. The court ordered both defendants to develop a 
plan for the creation of a continuum of community-based facilities 
as the basis of a remedial order. After lengthy negotiations, a plan 
was accepted and approved by the court i n A p r i l 1980. The plan and 
accompanying consent order represented a major effort to address 
the many and difficult problems involved i n implementing such a 
judicial order, including sound planning for the necessary changes, 
convincing the bureaucracy to accept changes, and designing an 
effective monitoring system to ensure compliance. 
The settlement required the city and federal governments to 
assess the needs and capabilities of every patient and set standards 
for mental health care, adequate and appropriate residential ser-
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vices, and support services i n the community. I n sum, the decree, 
w i t h its accompanying plan and standards, is a model for a com-
prehensive mental health system. Nevertheless, its goals have not 
been realized. Even after contempt proceedings, the local govern-
ment has been slow to dedicate the resources and effect the 
structural changes necessary to implement the decree. 
Cases that have followed Dixon and Brewster i n seeking to 
establish the right to treatment i n the community illustrate the 
continuing uncertainty about the scope of remedies. Approxi-
mately half of the states now have laws that require habilitation, 
normalization, or the provision of services i n the least restrictive 
setting for people w i t h developmental disabilities or mental retar-
dation. By contrast, fewer than 15 states have statutes requiring or 
even encouraging services i n the least restrictive environment for 
people w i t h mental illness. A n d of those, only three create entitle-
ments to deinstitutionalization and community services. Accord-
ingly, many people who could benefit from care i n a community 
setting find such care unavailable. 
One reason is money. The vast majority of states' mental health 
dollars remains tied to hospitals, leaving few community-care 
options available to discharged patients. Yet the state mental 
hospitals serve a diminishing proportion of the people who are 
mentally i l l . Almost 70 percent of public mental health dollars ($4.1 
billion) was spent on state hospitals i n one recent year,^° although 
most people who need emergency inpatient care are treated as 
psychiatric admissions to general hospitals. Veterans Administra-
tion facilities, or private hospitals.^^ A n d those who need non-crisis 
services are theoretically treated i n the community, where they 
live.^^ But because people w i t h mental illness often have no re-
sources and their caseworkers can seldom find a community agency 
that w i l l provide them future care, discharge too often means return 
to the streets. 
Access to quality mental health care cannot improve, therefore, 
unless the resources shift from the state institutions to the commu-
nity. I n Louisiana, for example, 103 state hospital patients were 
discharged into the community, and six wards were closed. More 
than one mi l l ion dollars was saved, and the allocation was perma-
nently transferred to support community programs for the 103 
patients and others. Even the closing of state hospitals is now being 
seriously entertained. I n Vermont, a recent study recommended 
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closing the state's only mental hospital and using the savings to 
help pay for community programs. 
Federal courts have generally been unwil l ing to reallocate mental 
health dollars from institutions to the local level i n part because of 
their unwillingness to recognize a constitutional right to mental 
health treatment i n the community.^^ However, a more common 
and so far more successful strategy for the reallocation of mental 
health dollars has been state-court litigation. 
Lawsuits filed i n state courts ask the courts to hold that laws 
requiring specific services be considered an obligation the state 
government ^cannot abandon, even if funds for those services are 
lacking. State courts have generally seemed hospitable to such suits 
challenging the failure to implement mandatory community pro-
grams. For example, i n a recent Arizona case, the plaintiff class, 
indigent mentally i l l residents of Maricopa County, asked the state 
court to compel the Department of Health Services, Arizona State 
Hospital, and the County Board of Supervisors to perform duties 
required by state mental health law, w h i c h include creating a 
unified and cohesive system of community mental health care. 
Although the defendants claimed inadequate funds, the lower court 
ordered them to fu l f i l l their m a n d a t e . A r n o l d v. Sam is the first 
decision by a state court to order the development of a comprehen-
sive system of care for chronically mentally i l l p e o p l e . T h e case is 
now on appeal to the state's highest court.^^ 
The Arnold decision is particularly instructive regarding the 
factors necessary to create such a system. Using as one model the 
consent decree i n Dixon, the court ordered the following services as 
necessary for the operation of an effective system: case manage-
ment, residential services, day treatment, outreach, medication, 
outpatient counseling, crisis stabilization, mobile crisis services, 
socialization, recreation, work adjustment, and transportation. I n 
fact, the court specifically recognized that deinstitutionalized in-
dividuals are often at r isk of rehospitalization because the residual 
impairments of their illness interfere w i t h successful adjustment to 
community life unless they have adequate community mental 
health services. Accordingly, the court further ordered the Arizona 
State Hospital to ensure that discharged patients have a place to l ive 
as w e l l as an adequate program for necessary treatment. 
In addition to the Arnold case, Klosterman v. Cuomo is a case 
that, if successful, w i l l result i n sevices for mentally i l l people who 
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are h o m e l e s s . N i n e patients discharged from N e w York State 
psychiatric facilities into shelters or onto the streets c la im viola-
tions of their federal and state constitutional and statutory rights to 
treatment and housing. The state court held that the plaintiffs had 
no constitutional right to treatment because they were no longer 
patients of state mental hospitals. The constitutional right to 
treatment i n the least restrictive environment, the court said, 
applies only when an individual is under restraint or otherwise 
confined. The defendants also sought dismissal of the suit, but the 
court held that the plaintiffs could challenge both the state's failure 
to prepare writ ten service plans for each discharged patient and its 
differential treatment of current and former patients. According to 
the court, if the state provides community care to patients dis-
charged from psychiatric facilities but not to severely mentally i l l 
former patients, then the plantiffs had a c la im under Section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act , w h i c h prohibits discrimination on the basis 
of disability by any program that receives federal funding. 
Yet advocates cannot expect that by obtaining a court order they 
can ensure an adequately funded system of community-based care. 
In Mental Health Association v. Deukmejian,^^ a California court 
denied relief to two plaintiffs who sought release from a state 
mental hospital alleging a constitutional right to treatment i n the 
community under the California constitution and state law. A l -
though California law creates a legislative preference for mental 
health treatment i n the least restrictive setting, the California 
Superior Court held that the statute did not create an absolute right 
to such treatment. Despite extensive evidence of the deficiencies of 
the hospital-based system, the court refused to determine how the 
mental health system should be constructed and funded. It held that 
states should have considerable latitude i n deciding how mental 
health services should be provided and whether these services 
should be provided at a l l . Indeed, it is possible that state courts w i l l 
not require defendants to do more than actively seek funding from 
the legislature. 
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Housing as the Critical Need 
In addition to mental health services, many mentally i l l people are 
in desperate need of housing. Without adequate housing or a 
permanent address, many could not even take advantage of services 
offered. Yet the combined effects of stigma and economic restric-
tions have prevented the development of housing options, from 
group homes to supported independent l iving units for people w i t h 
a mental disability. 
In addition to actions seeking to compel local and state govern-
ments to finance community care, litigation has been brought to 
keep barriers unrelated to funding from inhibiting the development 
of community services. These cases generally involve challenges to 
zoning laws and restrictive covenants. 
L i tera l ly hundreds of cases i n state courts have considered 
whether a zoning permit was properly withheld from a provider 
seeking to open a group home or whether a restrictive covenant 
l imit ing the use of land to single families could lawful ly exclude 
group homes for people w i t h mental disabilities.^° I n the past couple 
of years, however, strategies to expand housing for people w i t h 
mental disabilities have moved beyond traditional zoning battles. 
I n 1984 the Supreme Court decided Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Center,rejecting a city's denial of a permit to open a group home 
for 13 mentally retarded adults. I n a 6-3 decision, the Court upheld 
the right of a group home to open, concluding that the city's 
ostensible justifications for denying the special-use permit were 
either impermissable or unworthy of belief .^ ^ 
Since Cleburne, additional cases have rejected efforts to restrict 
development of housing for people w i t h mental disabilities. A 
federal court i n Florida declared unconstitutional several provisions 
of a M i a m i Beach ordinance regulating "adult congregate l iving 
facil it ies." The operators of an adult congregate l iving facil ity were 
denied a special-use permit because the proposed facilities exceeded 
four stories and were located on streets prohibited by the ordinance. 
The operators sued, and the court held that, under Cleburne, the 
city's zoning ordinance was unconstitutional because, for no 
rational reason, it treated residences for disabled people differently 
from those for other groups.^^ 
A similar suit was recently settled i n the United Sates Distr ict 
Court i n Ashland, Kentucky. I n this case, the city responded to a 
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provider's application to open a group home by rezoning the street 
on v^hich the home was to open so as to prohibit mult i - family uses. 
When the provider then tried to build and operate an apartment 
complex for mentally i l l and nonmentally i l l people, the city 
rezoned the entire city to prohibit the proposed building. After a suit 
was brought by the prospective residents and the provider, claiming 
that the city's actions constituted blatant discrimination against 
people w i t h mental illness, the city agreed to rescind its changes to 
the zoning laws and to grant the necessary permits. 
Imposing Treatment 
Relaxing Civil Commitment Laws 
Financing an adequate mental health system and developing 
housing for people w i t h mental illness are difficult tasks w h i c h can 
take a long time. Some commentators and psychiatrists are calling 
for quicker "solutions," by changing state c i v i l commitment laws 
ostensibly to ease the burdens on the community systems.^^ Cur-
rently, most states allow involuntary commitment only to in-
dividuals who are considered dangerous to themselves or others. I n 
practice, this standard requires that the grounds for commitment be 
established by objectively verifiable criteria. Some critics of dein-
stitutionalization would l ike to see these standards relaxed so that 
people could be moved "off the streets. . .and back i n facilities 
designed for people i n their condition. "^ ^ 
The American Psychiatric Association, i n its comprehensive 
report on the homeless mentally i l l , has hailed such attempts to 
allow homeless people to be committed more easily, under a 
standard that would permit the commitment of anyone who is 
" l i k e l y to suffer substantial mental or physical deterioration."^^ 
T h i s alternate standard focuses on whether the person is capable of 
tending to his or her own physical needs rather than on imminent or 
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potential dangerousness. It also places decisions regarding commit-
ment i n the hands of the medical profession rather than those of the 
legal community. 
T h i s movement toward "reinstitutionalization" is seen by some 
as responsive to the needs of families who have had to stand by 
helplessly and watch a loved one slowly degenerate into a seriously 
disabled person, without being able to provide treatment because 
the individual refuses.^^ By requiring a court to order involuntary 
commitment when it concludes that the person " lacks the capacity 
to make an informed decision concerning treatment," the A P A 
model law permits treatment of involuntary patients without their 
consent. The drafters of this proposal defend this provision by 
stating the patients have the right to treatment that is "the most 
appropriate and therapeutic available." T o some, returning people 
to mental hospitals is " a simple solution to the problems of 
deinstitutionalization such as homelessness."^^ 
Yet the movement to broaden the grounds for involuntary com-
mitment does not respond adequately to the real needs of people 
who are homeless for decent housing, rehabilitation, and other 
services. I n fact, it may have serious implications for both homeless 
and nonhomeless people.^° 
T h e argument for changing commitment is also inconsistent 
w i t h current trends i n mental health care. While it is true that since 
1955 the number of residents of state mental hospitals on any given 
day has dropped from 559,000 to 120,000,^^ these hospitals are not 
empty. Many mental hospitals have become, instead, short-term, 
acute-care facilities.^^ In fact, inpatient psychiatric admissions to 
both state mental hospitals and psychiatric wards of general hospi-
tals have risen to approximately one mi l l ion a year.^^ 
In addition, there is l ittle evidence to suggest that the current 
c iv i l commitment standards actually prevent people from receiving 
treatment i n mental hospitals. Other factors, such as medical 
decisions not to hospitalize and the lack of available beds, may play 
a larger role."^ "^  
Finally, someone who is committed (regardless of whether exist-
ing or proposed standards are applied) w i l l eventually be discharged, 
often w i t h i n 20 days.^^ Most states resist increasing their inpatient 
population, i n part because the cost of inpatient care is high and 
because long-term inpatient care is simply not cl inical ly indicated 
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i n most c a s e s C o m m i t t i n g more people, then, may simply strain 
hospital resources without securing care for people who may be 
sick. Indeed, current standards requiring dangerousness for com-
mittment cannot adequately determine who does or does not need 
treatment. There is therefore no guarantee that less stringent 
standards w i l l not suffer from the same inexactitude. 
Outpatient Commitment 
Some states are also considering enactment of so-called "outpa-
tient commitment" for people who do not require hospitalization. 
Outpatient commitment, as currently used, refers to the procedure 
by w h i c h an individual is ordered by a court to receive treatment i n 
the community although he or she does not meet the state's 
standard for c i v i l commitment.^^ T h i s procedure has recently been 
enacted i n several states, including North Carolina, Hawai i , Geor-
gia and, i n slightly different form, i n Tennessee.^^ 
Outpatient commitment proposals may be w e l l intentioned, seen 
as a way to help someone obtain treatment and avoid institutionali-
zation. Most such laws have been put forth by those concerned 
about "revolving door" patients—people admitted to a mental 
hospital, stabilized and then released, often to shelters or the 
streets, only to be readmitted again and again. Yet outpatient 
commitment laws, l ike the proposals calling for relaxation of 
commitment laws, w i l l s imply not solve the problems they attempt 
to address. 
First, outpatient commitment laws have been proposed as a way 
to reduce the money spent by states to maintain large state 
hospitals, based on the assumption that community treatment is 
less costly than hospital-based care. Such an assumption is correct, 
but not if the community treatment is mandated indefinitely. A s 
one doctor i n North Carolina has stated, a mentally i l l person 
subject to an outpatient commitment order " w i l l stay w i t h us 
forever," requiring the state to pay for continuous treatment.'^^ 
Accordingly, the state w i l l be forced to pay not only the cost of care 
for people who are hospitalized under existing commitment laws, 
but also for those who are required to receive outpatient services on 
a daily and indefinite basis. 
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Some states are charging the patients for care. Yet the fundamen-
tal problem associated w i t h deinstitutionalization has been the 
state's failure to provide and adequately fund mental health services 
in the community. Shifting the fiscal burden to the patient, espe-
cially the indigent patient, w i l l not alleviate this problem. 
In addition to costing the state money, outpatient commitment 
may create new problems for a person w i t h a mental illness.^° First, 
it is unclear how a court may order a person to comply w i t h 
outpatient treatment i n a state that recognizes the right of a 
competent mentally i l l person to refuse treatment, w h i c h many 
states now do. The "right to refuse" doctrine is based on the 
traditional theories of the right to privacy and of informed consent, 
w h i c h provide that a person may be treated without consent and 
against his or her w i l l only if the person is shown to be incompe-
tent—i.e. incapable of making an informed treatment decision. A n d 
if a person is found incompetent, a guardian must be appointed to 
make decisions on his or her behalf. In the context of outpatient 
commitment, this creates a paradox: A judge can order a person to 
do something that he or she has a legal right to refuse to do. 
Further, i t is w e l l established that the greater the infringement of 
liberty represented by the state action, the more procedural protec-
tions must be afforded an individual before he or she may be 
subjected to the state action. Such protections include the right to 
notice of the state's proposed action, the right to an attorney, the 
right to a hearing before a judge w i t h i n a certain number of days, and 
the right to cross-examine witnesses. States vary i n the protections 
they provide. But it is clear that someone who is subject to an 
outpatient commitment order suffers a significant deprivation of 
liberty and should therefore be guaranteed at least the procedural 
protections accorded individuals i n proceedings for c i v i l commit-
ment as an inpatient. 
Finally, it is not evident exactly what type of penalty, if any, w i l l 
be imposed if a person fails to comply w i t h the terms of an 
outpatient commitment order. W i l l the person be sentenced to ja i l 
for contempt of court? Or sent to the state mental hospital? Some 
states have dealt w i t h this issue by choosing not to deal w i t h it, 
including no enforcement mechanism i n their state outpatient 
commitment statutes. Others, such as Tennessee, provide that 
person can be institutionalized for failing to comply w i t h an 
outpatient treatment plan, but only after a court hearing. 
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Taking Homeless People Off the Streets 
Th e United States Supreme Court has recognized that "[a]mong 
the historic Hberties. . . [ is] a right to be free f r o m . . .unjustified 
intrusions on personal security. The Supreme Court has also 
stated that "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully 
guarded than the right of every individual to the possession and 
control of his own person, free from al l restraint or interference of 
others, unless by clear or unquestionable authority of law."^^ 
O n the other hand, the individual's liberty interests i n being free 
to decide to seek or refuse medical care or shelter must be balanced 
against the countervailing interest of the state i n the treatment and 
care of people who are incompetent, under its parens patriae or 
parental power, and i n using its police power to protect the public 
health and safety. 
Historically, the state's parens patriae power authorizes the state 
to act on behalf of minors and people who are incompetent to make 
their own decisions concerning personal safety and w e l f a r e . T h u s 
the state may legally exercise its power to assist incompetent 
people. 
The state also has a right to protect the health and safety of its 
citizens. The courts have strictly l imited this police power, how-
ever, to the extent that i t is exercised at the expense of an 
individual's liberty interests.^^ In balancing the interests of the state 
and the individual, courts have weighed such factors as the level of 
intrusion of the person's liberty, the degree of societal harm, and the 
level of certainty that state intervention w i l l prevent such harm. 
For example, courts have upheld requirements of vaccination to 
prevent epidemics, laws requiring that helmets be worn by motor-
cyclists,^^ and mandatory fluoridation of the water supply.^^ I n other 
words, the state's interest i n saving the lives of its citizens may 
justify the intrusion of coercive treatment or confinement i n a 
shelter. 
However, where the harm to the individual (such as the harm to a 
homeless person remaining on the street) is more speculative and 
less imminent, the state would have greater difficulty justifying the 
level of intrusion involved i n involuntary treatment or confine-
ment. A s mentioned above, the Supreme Court held i n the Donald-
son case that without additional justification the state has no right 
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to confine a person who is not dangerous to others and who is 
capable of surviving safely i n freedom by h im- or herself or w i t h the 
help of wi l l ing and responsible family members or friends. 
In N e w York C i t y the Mayor has put these principles to the test. 
He has ordered the police to transport homeless people to 
emergency rooms of a municipal hospital for psychiatric or medical 
evaluation when the temperature drops below f r e e z i n g . T h e policy 
raises many questions. Although designed to protect a homeless 
person from freezing to death, it may cause more problems than it 
solves. 
Outreach to people who are homeless and mentally i l l is ex-
tremely difficult. They often hide, purposely not to be found. 
However, experience has shown that homeless people, including 
homeless people who are mentally i l l , generally manage to satisfy 
their essential needs. They become familiar w i t h a network of 
"services" and develop a pattern of supportive l iving, finding food at 
soup kitchens or from mobile teams and passers-by, and shelter i n 
doorways, on heat grates, i n subways and bus terminals.^° 
On October 28, 1987, Mayor Koch's policy was challenged. N e w 
York C i t y psychiatrists took Joyce Brown (aka Bi l l ie Boggs) from the 
sidewalk where she had lived for nearly a year and a half, brought 
her to Bellevue Hospital, injected medication and confined her i n a 
locked w a r d . M s . B r o w n had been examined at psychiatr ic 
emergency rooms at least five times that year and found not to 
require involuntary hospitalization. The city's own statistics re-
vealed that nearly half of the 215 people brought to emergency 
rooms from the street by city psychiatrist teams i n 1988 were found 
not to require hospitalizaton. 
Subsequently Ms. Boggs challenged the Mayor's policy and a 
lower court agreed. However, the lower court's decision was re-
versed by an intermediate state appeals court, w h i c h held that Ms. 
Boggs was mentally i l l and needed treatment to prevent serious 
harm to her well-being.^^ It is w e l l established i n N e w York that " a 
person may be involuntari ly confined for care and treatment, where 
his or her mental illness manifests itself i n neglect or refusal to care 
for themselves to such an extent that there is presented serious 
harm to their own well-being." The appeals court found significant 
evidence that Ms. Boggs was i n need of such treatment. Conse-
quently she was involuntari ly committed. Once back i n the hospi-
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tal, Bi l l ie Boggs refused medication. She went back to court and the 
court agreed that under N e w York law she could not be forcibly 
medicated i n nonemergency situations. The hospital then released 
her because they could not treat her w i t h medication against her 
w i l l . 
Refusing Medication 
Th e right to refuse treatment, particularly medication, is unques-
tionably one of the most controversial subjects i n mental health law 
today. Voluntari ly admitted patients have generally enjoyed such a 
right—at least i n theory. Involuntarily committed patients' right to 
refuse treatment, particularly antipsychotic medication, has been 
quite another matter. Nonetheless, several courts have affirmed 
that even involuntarily committed patients have a constitutional 
right to refuse treatment i n certain circumstances. 
T o call the debate one about the right to refuse medication is 
somewhat misleading, however. U n t i l recently, there was no dis-
pute that patients had a right to refuse treatment, including 
medication, as a corollary of the legal requirement of informed 
consent prior to treatment. The administration of treatment (even 
beneficial treatment) without consent is prohibited as unlawful 
assault and battery and punishable by cr iminal as w e l l as c i v i l 
penalties. The real question then is what is required to override a 
patient's refusal. 
Most concede that the right to refuse medication can be overcome 
i n emergencies involving imminent danger to physical health of the 
individual or others. Recent court decisions a l l recognize that 
forced medication must be permitted i n certain emergencies, at 
least i n inst i tutions. But most courts have required that the 
decision to treat must be made by a qualified physician, less 
restrictive alternatives to medication must be demonstrably insuf-
ficient, and the primary purpose of the medication must be to 
mitigate a physical emergency, not merely to t r e a t . A further 
l imitat ion is that the emergency must occur i n an institution. 
While the courts have not yet ruled precisely whether someone 
l iving i n the community may be forcibly medicated, language i n 
some cases seems to indicate that they may not. For example, the 
Eighth Circui t Court of Appeals recently noted that "an individual 
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who is not i n full-t ime custody, care and treatment at a hospital 
cannot be forcibly m e d i c a t e d . A n d i n Rennie v. Klein, the Court 
of Appeals for the T h i r d Circui t stated: " A n individual who has not 
been committed to a mental institution has a right to refuse 
medication sought to be administered against his w i l l . " ^ ^ 
The question then becomes under what circumstances may the 
patient's refusal be overridden i n a nonemergency situation? Some 
federal courts have held, and the American Psychiatric Association 
has argued, that a l l that is required is exercise of a psychiatrist's 
professional judgment to override any patient's r e f u s a l . M o s t 
courts, however, recognize that a threshold issue is the competence 
of the individual refusing medication. 
Competence is a different legal concept from mental illness or 
commitability; it means having the capacity to make decisions 
about health treatment. Most courts hold that a person who is 
competent has a right to make such decisions. Another key issue is, 
therefore, who decides whether or not a patient is competent. 
Advocates argue for judicial decision; states argue that doctors can 
make this decision, w i t h or without the aid of "independent" 
hospital-based review boards. Some courts have held that if a 
patient is incompetent, a hospital can go ahead and forcibly medi-
cate,-others require that hospitals s t i l l go to court and that courts 
make a "substituted judgment" decision or a decision i n the 
patient's best interests. 
The lower court i n Rogers v. Commissioner of Mental Health, 
one of the first courts to consider this issue, held that incompetent 
patients, l ike others, cannot be medicated without consent except 
in emergencies.^^ It further held that only a patient's legal guardian 
can supply the necessary consent. T h e appellate court i n Rogers and 
other courts have deferred more to attending clinicians. For exam-
ple, i n Rennie v, Klein, the court would permit teams of clinicians, 
acting according to specified procedures, to override even guardians' 
decisions or to make their own decisions when it is difficult to 
obtain the guardian's c o n s e n t . T h e Rennie court carved out 
another exception to the general rule prohibiting forced medication. 
It held that a committed patient may be medicated against his or her 
w i l l if "without [medication] the patient is incapable of participa-
ting i n any treatment plan that w i l l give h i m a realistic opportunity 
to improve his condition, or if it w i l l shorten the required commit-
ment time."'° 
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Most courts have rejected such an exception. They reason that, 
except i n an emergency, the sole justification for medication is to 
help the patient and, absent a finding of incompetence, a l l persons, 
including those involuntarily confined, have a right to decide 
whether and how they w i s h to be treated.^^ 
A couple of recent cases illustrate these points. I n cases decided 
less than one month apart, two federal appeals courts reached 
dramatically different conclusions. I n United States v. Charters, 
the Fourth Circui t Court of Appeals upheld the right of a person 
found incompetent to stand trial to refuse psychotropic medica-
tion.^^ The court declared that refusal can only be overridden i n an 
emergency or when the patient has been found by a court to be 
incompetent to make decisions about medical care. The appeals 
court also reviewed the standard to be followed i n the case of a 
person who is incompetent to make decisions about his or her 
medical care. It rejected a "professional-judgment standard," adopt-
ing instead a "substituted judgment standard." T h i s standard 
provides that a determination must be made based on what the 
patient would have chosen if he or she were competent and, if that is 
not possible, what decision would be i n his or her best interest. The 
question remains, however, whether this case applies to c iv i l ly 
committed individuals and whether the outcome would be differ-
ent if "without medication a patient w i l l suffer a severe, immediate 
and irreversible deterioration." 
The Eighth Circui t Court of Appeals, i n Dautremont v. Broad-
lawns Hospital, held that decisions to forcibly medicate a c iv i l ly 
committed patient must be the result of the exercise of professional 
j u d g m e n t . T h i s court reasoned that although the patient's "l iberty 
from bodily restraint, and therefore, arguably, mental restraint, 
survives involuntary commitment," the liberty interest was out-
weighed by the government's legitimate interests. Here, according 
to the court, the government's interests included returning the 
patient's behavior "to that w h i c h is acceptable to society and by the 
professionals' reasonable judgment here that the objective can best 
be accomplished by the administration of certain types and levels of 
psychotherapeutic drugs."^'^ 
The reasons to refuse medication considered most persuasive to 
courts continue to be religion and concerns about contracting 
tardive dyskinesia. Courts take both very seriously. I n several 
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jurisdictions a person w i t h reHgious objections is entitled to a 
judicial hearing before being forcibly medicated, whi le the rights of 
people w i t h nonreligious objections are unresolved/^ 
I n Indiana, for example, the supreme court, emphasizing a 
person's liberty interest i n being free from intrusions into the body 
and mind, as w e l l as the dangers associated w i t h tardive dyskinesia, 
recently established standards to decide when a patient may refuse 
medication under an Indiana statute permitting a person to petition 
a court asserting a right to refuse medication/^ In In Re M.P., the 
court held that i n order to override a patient's statutory right to 
refuse treatment, the state must demonstrate by clear and convinc-
ing evidence (1) that a current and individual medical assessment of 
the patient's condition has been made; (2) that it resulted i n the 
honest judgment of the psychiatrist that medication would be of 
substantial benefit i n treating the patient's condition, and not just a 
means of controlling the individual's behavior; and (3) that the 
probable benefits from the poposed treatment outweigh the r isk of 
harm to, and personal concerns of, the patient. T h i s court is the first 
to reject the possibility of dangerousness as a justification for 
medicating a person without obtaining prior authorization from a 
court. Th e Indiana court also emphasized that forcible medication 
could not be ordered unless the court found it to be the least 
restrictive alternative, and that al l forcible medication orders must 
be periodically reviewed and medication stopped if a patient did not 
substantially benefit from the treatment. 
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Conclusion 
T h e development of mental health law has been rapid. Courts have 
recognized new rights and, arguably, taken away others. For in -
stitutionalized individuals, the exact parameters of the right to 
treatment and community placement and to refuse medication 
have begun to be clarified. Yet lack of resources as w e l l as prejudice 
continues to prevent people w i t h mental illness from being truly 
integrated into our society. I n short, the issue of the rights and 
services to w h i c h people are entitled is l ike ly to continue as a major 
battleground i n the years ahead. 
Yet, as the history of the development of mental health law 
shows, courts have the potential to become significant players i n 
the effort to develop community-care systems w h i c h provide de-
cent conditions for people w i t h mental illness. But i t remains for ex-
patients, consumers, family members, health care professionals, 
lawyers and other advocates to work together to ful f i l l that poten-
t ial . Surely one of the greatest challenges facing us al l is to identify 
and implement strategies that w i l l expand the availability of 
effective and quality community services and decent and low-cost 
housing. Failure to do so may result i n either a return to the days of 
large custodial institutions or the reality of people left to l ive and die 
on the streets of our nation's cities. 
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